Theoretical boundaries of armed conflict and human rights
New York : Cambridge University Press, 2016
This chapter explores how international humanitarian law (IHL) can prohibit morally arbitrary killing in armed conflict and thereby avoid substantive conflict with international human rights law (IHRL). The chapter distinguishes between different senses of moral permissibility (fact-relative, evidence-relative, and belief-relative; objective and subjective; direct and indirect) and shows how different IHL norms can be interpreted to guarantee that lawful killings are morally permissible in one or more of these senses. Finally, the chapter contests the view of Janina Dill and Henry Shue that IHL should seek not to prohibit human rights violations but rather to minimize human rights violations. Instead, IHL should aim to help combatants better conform to their moral obligations.
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