Chapter

Prosecuting members of the armed forces for core international crimes : a judicial act in the self-interest of the armed forces ?

Roberta Arnold

Military self-interest in accountability for core international crimes

Brussels : Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2015

p. 341-357

English

In this chapter, Roberta Arnold explores the possible self-interest in prosecuting serious international crimes, both for the military as an institution and for individual members of the military. From the institutional perspective, repressing serious international crimes benefits the military’s image, corporate spirit and mission accomplishment. On an individual level, high-ranking officers may have an interest in the smooth exercise of command and control and in avoiding criminal charges as superiors, while ordinary soldiers may want to distance themselves from the misconduct of their comrades and work in a safe environment. Arnold also deems that prosecution will better serve the military’s interest if carried out by a military judicial system that is independent, transparent and fair.

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• Military self-interest in accountability for core international crimes / Morten Bergsmo and Song Tianying (ed.)