Deterring jus in bello violations of superiors as a foundation for military justice reform
Author zone:
Robert Bejesky
Host item entries:
Wayne law review, Vol. 60, no. 2, Winter 2015, p. 395-467
Languages:
English
Abstract:
This article emphasizes that a decisive query to both curbing battlefield crimes, and to cultivating favorable behavior within existing hierarchical dynamics, should center on examining whether there are effectual deterrents to illicit acts during armed combat in the form of anticipated punishment for perpetrators throughout the military hierarchy and whether there are sensible remedies for victims. Expectations about the law and remedies may heighten vigilance when officials issue chain of command directives and may curtail warfare transgressions by subordinates through exemplars of laudatory behavior. By contrast, excessively elastic precedential conceptions of military necessity approaching impunity may pare the success of achieving the policy intent of substantive and procedural reforms.