This article discusses NIACs in the Philippines and briefly notes the challenges they pose to the security sector in applying the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL). To provide a basic framework in understanding the nature of conflict in the Philippines, an organizational-level analysis of the NIACs is necessary. It must be noted that on the ground, from the individual and operational levels of analysis, it is not so neatly delineated. Civilians can be recruited to work seasonally for an insurgent group and then quickly and seamlessly resume their civilian lives after operations are completed. Added to this complexity are the changing organizational labels civilians effortlessly assume without much question. Some civilians may work for one insurgent group that has an outstanding peace agreement with the government and then on the same day join a command structure of a known terrorist group. Then they very quickly switch to supporting relatives and kin who belong to a group currently in peace negotiations with the government. The NIACs in the Philippines are largely a homegrown phenomenon with some components heavily influenced by foreign elements. Conflicts rooted in ideologies outside the Philippines have been coopted to provide a philosophical justification to a grassroots-driven insurgency. This article will primarily focus on two major NIACs facing the Philippines: the Maoist group and the Moro group.